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Summary
Political ideologies summarize dimensions of life that
define how a person organizes their public and private behavior, including their attitudes associated with
sex, family, education, and personal autonomy [1, 2].
Despite the abstract nature of such sensibilities, fundamental features of political ideology have been found
to be deeply connected to basic biological mechanisms
[3–7] that may serve to defend against environmental
challenges like contamination and physical threat [8–12].
These results invite the provocative claim that neural
responses to nonpolitical stimuli (like contaminated
food or physical threats) should be highly predictive
of abstract political opinions (like attitudes toward gun
control and abortion) [13]. We applied a machinelearning method to fMRI data to test the hypotheses that
brain responses to emotionally evocative images predict
individual scores on a standard political ideology assay.
Disgusting images, especially those related to animalreminder disgust (e.g., mutilated body), generate neural
responses that are highly predictive of political orientation
even though these neural predictors do not agree with
participants’ conscious rating of the stimuli. Images
from other affective categories do not support such
predictions. Remarkably, brain responses to a single
disgusting stimulus were sufficient to make accurate predictions about an individual subject’s political ideology.
These results provide strong support for the idea that
fundamental neural processing differences that emerge
under the challenge of emotionally evocative stimuli may
serve to structure political beliefs in ways formerly
unappreciated.

*Correspondence: read@vt.edu
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).

Results
We carried out a passive picture-viewing experiment to test
the hypothesis that nonpolitical but affectively evocative
images elicit brain responses that predict political ideology
as assessed by a standard political ideology measure. Healthy
volunteers (n = 83) were instructed to look at presented pictures while lying in the scanner, and, to control for attentiveness, we instructed them to press a button when a fixation
cross appeared on the screen (Figure 1). Images were sampled
from the International Affective Pictures database [14] and
included disgusting, threatening, pleasant, and neutral images
(see Appendix S1 available online). Each emotional condition
had two subconditions (see the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures). After the fMRI session, participants completed
a behavioral rating session in which they rated all pictures
they had seen in the scanner (using a nine-point Likert scale)
as disgusting, threatening, or pleasant. Lastly, participants
filled out computer-based questionnaires assessing their
political attitudes, disgust sensitivity, and state/trait anxiety
level. See the Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details of the behavioral rating and survey sessions.
Political ideology was summed from several survey items
(Appendix S2), including ideological position, partisan affiliation, and policy preferences (e.g., gun control and immigration,
presented in the well-known Wilson-Patterson format [15]).
Survey items on political ideology were normalized continuously from 0 (extremely liberal) to 1 (extremely conservative)
(see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Figure 2A
shows its distribution across all participants. Political attitudes
and interest did not show a significant linear relationship
[r(81) = 20.148, p = 0.182], but instead showed a U-shaped
curve (Figure S1A), indicating that greater political interest is
associated with polarized political attitudes. When tested on
a subset of participants, our measure of political attitudes
shows excellent test-retest reliability (test-retest Pearson
correlation coefficient = 0.952; Figure 2B). To focus our analyses on polarized political groups, we divided participants
into three groups based on their political ideology scores
(Table S1): liberal (n = 28), moderate (n = 27), and conservative
(n = 28).
As seen in Figure 2C, groups did not significantly differ in
subjective ratings of disgusting, threatening, or pleasant pictures (also see Table S2). Also, there were no significant group
differences on self-report measures except that the conservative group had marginally higher disgust sensitivity than the
liberal group [t(54) = 1.711, p = 0.093; Figure S1B and Table
S1]. Note that emotional states can be implicit or nonconscious under some conditions [16]. Self-report measures
may fail to detect some individual differences in disgust sensitivity [17].
Having characterized liberal and conservative groups
behaviorally and confirmed blood-oxygen-level dependent
(BOLD) responses to affective pictures (Figure S2 and Table
S3), we used a machine-learning approach to predict individual differences in political orientation from the patterns of
whole-brain BOLD responses. Specifically, we applied a
penalized regression method called the elastic net [18] to
our fMRI data (Figures 2D and S3 and the Supplemental
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Figure 1. Time Course of the Experiment
Each subject first participated in an affective
picture-viewing task in the fMRI scanner, during
which they viewed 80 color pictures (20
disgusting, 20 threatening, 20 pleasant, and 20
neutral pictures). Occasionally, a fixation cross
appeared on the screen, and participants were
asked to press a button as soon as they saw the
cross. Each picture was presented for 4 s, and
the fixation cross was presented until participants
pressed a button. The mean intertrial interval (ITI)
was 10 s. Next, participants completed a behavioral rating session and several computerized
surveys (see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures). See also Figure S1.

Experimental Procedures). The elastic net algorithm offers
several advantages for fMRI data, including automatic variable
selection (i.e., regression coefficients of unimportant variables
[voxels] shrink to zero) and model regularization, which increases the interpretability of the findings. The elastic
net also enjoys a grouping effect, which clusters highly correlated predictors into a set of groups. The grouping effect is
useful for fMRI data because they contain many correlated
predictors (voxels) due to its inherent nature (i.e., a brain region
may consist of many voxels) and spatial smoothing, which is
a commonly used preprocessing step. Previous studies
demonstrated that the elastic net performs better than least
absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO), especially
when the number of predictors is much higher than the
number of observations [18]. The elastic net is beginning to
be applied to fMRI data [19, 20] and appears to be a promising
tool for developing predictive models from neuroimaging
(and other types of) data. Using the elastic net algorithm
(penalized logistic regression analysis) and contrast maps
([disgusting > neutral], [threatening > neutral], or [pleasant >
neutral]), we probed brain regions critical for cross-validated
classification accuracy (liberal versus conservative groups;
see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
Figure 3A shows a network of brain regions predicting conservative and liberal group membership revealed by the
machine-learning method with the [disgusting > neutral]
contrast. Separate tests for the out-of-sample performance
confirmed the robustness of the findings (Figure 3B and the
Supplemental Experimental Procedures). No voxel survived
cross-validations on other contrasts. Red-to-yellow and
blue-to-green regions indicate voxels predicting conservative
and liberal groups, respectively. As seen in Figure 3A, conservative group membership was predicted by increases in the
basal ganglia (peak MNI = [16, 8, 28], k = 234)/thalamus
(peak MNI = [20, 218, 6])/periaqueductal gray (PAG; peak
MNI = [10, 224, 212]/hippocampus (peak MNI = [214, 24,
214])/amygdala (peak MNI = [218, 24, 214]), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; peak MNI = [244, 4, 52], k = 26), middle/
superior temporal gyrus (MTG/STG; peak MNI = [260, 244, 6],
k = 33), presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA; peak MNI =
[24, 8, 56], k = 56), fusiform gyrus (FFG; peak MNI = [242,
252, 210], k = 24 in the left side and [42, 260, 210], k = 16
in the right side), and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; peak MNI =
[52, 28, 4], k = 15). The increase in the secondary somatosensory cortex (S2)/posterior insula (peak MNI = [240, 226, 19])/
inferior parietal lobule (IPL; peak MNI = [248, 240, 36], k =

125 in the left side and [48, 252, 54], k = 17 in the right side),
frontal insula (MNI = [40, 16, 212], k = 19), and precentral gyrus
(peak MNI = [238, 212, 50], k = 25 in the left sid and [40, 212,
52], k = 13 in the right side) predicted liberal group membership. Note that the group differences using the traditional general linear modeling (GLM) revealed similar findings with some
differences (Figure S2D, Table S4, and the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). The mean area under the curve
(AUC) of the receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curve
was 0.981 (SD = 0.043). See the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures and Figure S4 for more details and additional results using penalized linear regression across all participants.
When we examined the prediction accuracy of each disgust
subcondition (core/contamination and animal reminder), only
animal-reminder disgust (e.g., mutilated body) was a strong
predictor of political attitudes (Figure 3C; mean AUC = 0.998,
SD = 0.003 for animal reminder; mean AUC = 0.548, SD =
0.125 for core/contamination).
Recent work suggests that BOLD time-series data from a
single stimulus can categorically differentiate healthy individuals from those diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder
(unpublished data). Lu et al. applied a machine-learning
approach to time-series data from a specific region of interest
and demonstrated that single-stimulus brain responses to a
specific kind of stimulus could be used to make accurate categorical predictions of disorder status. We tested the hypothesis that a single-stimulus measurement combined with a
machine-learning approach may contain enough information
to predict liberal and conservative group membership per individual participant. Following Lu et al., we extracted the entire
BOLD time-series response to the first disgusting picture.
Time-series data every 2 s were spatially averaged within
each of two types of patterns shown in Figure 3A: (+) voxels
(red-to-yellow regions predicting conservative group) and
(2) voxels (blue-to-green regions predicting liberal group)
(see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
As seen in Figure 4A, the single-stimulus presentation of the
disgusting pictures reliably differentiated the conservative and
liberal groups in the (+) voxels. The hemodynamic response of
the conservative group had a steeper slope and a higher peak
than that of the liberal group. The mean AUC of the ROC curve
using the single-stimulus presentation was 0.845 (SD = 0.009;
Figure 4B). When we used each region of interest within the (+)
voxels for the same analysis (Figure 4C), the thalamus (mean
AUC = 0.816, SD = 0.023) and the DLPFC (mean AUC =
0.807, SD = 0.018) were the strongest predictive regions,
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Figure 2. Behavioral Results and an Illustration of Workflow for Penalized Regression Analysis
(A) Distribution of political attitudes (orientation). Political attitudes are scaled from 0 (extremely liberal) to 1 (extremely conservative) (mean = 0.500, SD =
0.225). We divided participants (n = 83) into three groups (liberal [n = 28], moderate [n = 27], and conservative [n = 28]) based on their political attitudes. Red
dotted lines indicate tertiles (33.3% and 66.6%).
(B) Test-retest reliability of political attitudes. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.952, p < 2.2 3 10216, and the robust correlation coefficient is 0.986, p <
2.0 3 10216.
(C) Subjective ratings of emotional pictures for each group. Error bars indicate 61 SE.
(D) Schematic illustration of workflow for a machine-learning (penalized-regression) model. A 10-fold cross-validation is used to estimate two tuning parameters of the elastic net model. The survival rate was projected back into the brain space (see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures and Figure S3A).
See also Figure S3.

followed by the basal ganglia (mean AUC = 0.789, SD = 0.005),
FFG (mean AUC = 0.764, SD = 0.047), pre-SMA (mean AUC =
0.733, SD = 0.044), amygdala/hippocampus (mean AUC =
0.721, SD = 0.079), PAG (mean AUC = 0.662, SD = 0.100),
and MTG/STG (mean AUC = 0.654, SD = 0.105). While increase
in the (2) voxels predicted liberal group membership with full
data, none of the BOLD time-series data from the (2) voxels
survived using the single-stimulus analysis.
Discussion
Neuroscience has started to provide rich information about the
neurophysiological processes underlying political behavior.
Our results have important implications for the links between
biology, emotions, political ideology, and human nature more
fundamentally. While previous studies using skin conductance
response [9–11], neuroimaging [21–24], and questionnaire [25,
26] measures suggested the role of emotions in political attitudes, to our knowledge, this is the first fMRI study revealing
multivariate patterns of brain activity that differ between liberals and conservatives during emotional processing of sensory stimuli. Accumulating evidence suggests that cognition
and emotion are deeply intertwined [27], and a view of segregating cognition and emotion is becoming obsolete [28].
People tend to think that their political views are purely cognitive (i.e., rational). However, our results further support the
notion that emotional processes are tightly coupled to complex and high-dimensional human belief systems [13], and
such emotional processes might play a much larger role than
we currently believe, possibly outside our awareness of its

influence [29]. Despite growing evidence from various fields,
including genetics, cognitive neuroscience, and psychology,
many political scientists remain skeptical of research connecting biological factors with political ideology, arguing variously
that biology is irrelevant to central political questions [30], that
the theoretical basis for expecting biology to be relevant is
weak and murky [31], that acknowledging a role for biology
is reductionist [32], and that recognizing the relevance of
biology to human beliefs and behaviors is potentially
dangerous [33]. We hope some of this skepticism can be alleviated from our demonstration that fMRI data, even from a
single stimulus, can serve as a strong predictor of political
ideology.
Several groups have suggested that people are born with
certain dispositions and traits that influence the formation of
their political beliefs [3, 4]. Also, several studies have shown
that life history (e.g., [34]) and traumatic experiences [35] can
affect political views. Our results are consistent with the idea
that political beliefs are connected to neurobiological composition. But both genetics and life history play an important role
in establishing both connections between neuroanatomical regions and the propensity for these regions to respond to environmental stimuli. We have not isolated the distinct roles
played by genetics and life history in the development of the
brain responses that we measured.
A wide range of brain regions contributed to the prediction
of political ideology (Figure 3A), including those known from
past work to be involved in the processing and interoception
of disgust and other stimuli with negative affective valence,
but also those involved in more basic aspects of attentive
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Figure 3. Multivariate Patterns of Brain Activity that Predict Political Ideology
(A) Voxels predicting conservative (red-to-yellow) or liberal (blue-to-green) group membership from penalized logistic regression analysis (cluster size,
k R 10). Survival rate is closely related to voxel (regression) weights (see Figure S3B). DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; pre-SMA, presupplementary
motor area; Str, striatum; GP, globus pallidus; HIPP, hippocampus; AMYG, amygdala; MTG/STG, middle/superior temporal gyrus; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus;
S2, secondary somatosensory cortex; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; and FFG, fusiform gyrus. The color scale denotes the survival rate.
(B) Distribution of cross-validated area under the curve (AUC). We ran 1,000 iterations of 5-fold cross-validation procedure. For each iteration, we first found
the l that minimized the out-of-sample binomial deviance of four folds (80% of the data). Then, for each of the five folds, we computed the area under the
receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curve using predictions from the model fit to the remaining data using the minimum l. This resulted in the 5,000
(1,000 iterations 3 5 AUCs per iteration) AUC calculations plotted in the histogram (mean = 0.757, median = 0.771, mode = 0.833, SD = 0.150). The inset
in the top-left corner shows out-of-sample prediction performance on the half of the data (test set) when the model is trained on the other half of the
data (training set) for penalized linear regression. The x and y axes show the Z scores of actual political attitudes and predicted political attitudes from
BOLD signals, respectively. Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.52, p = 0.0004; robust correlation coefficient = 0.44, p = 0.0024. See the Supplemental Experimental Procedures for complete details.
(C) Voxels predicting conservative or liberal group membership from each subcondition of disgust (i.e., using contrast maps of [animal-reminder
disgust > neutral] or [core/contamination disgust > neutral]; see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures for the details of subconditions). The voxel survival criterion is the same as that for (A).
See also Figure S2.

sensory processing: we found regions known to be involved in
disgust recognition [17, 36–38] (e.g., insula, basal ganglia, and
amygdala), perception of bodily signals [39] (e.g., insula), the
experience of physical/social pain [40] or observing others in
pain [41] (e.g., S2, insula, PAG, and thalamus), and emotion
regulation [42] (e.g., DLPFC, insula, amygdala, and preSMA), along with regions involved in information integration
[43] (e.g., thalamus and amygdala), attention [43, 44] (e.g.,
amygdala, IPL, FFG, STG/MTG), memory retrieval [44, 45]
(e.g., hippocampus, amygdala, and IPL), and also inhibitory
control [46] (e.g., IFG, DLPFC, and pre-SMA), perhaps to suppress innate responses. Although our results suggest that
disgusting pictures evoke very different emotional processing
in conservatives and liberals, it will take a range of targeted

studies in the future to tease apart the separate contribution
of each brain circuit.
We proposed that conservatives, compared to liberals, have
greater negativity bias [13], which includes both disgusting
and threatening conditions in our study. Our finding that only
disgusting pictures, especially in the animal-reminder category, differentiate conservatives from liberals might be
indicative of a primacy for disgust in the pantheon of human
aversions, but it is also possible that this result is due to the
fact that, compared to threat, disgust is much easier to evoke
with visual images on a computer screen.
Lastly, this study raises several important but unaddressed
questions. First, while political ideology has effects on many
forms of behavior (including, but not limited to, voting
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behavior), it is unknown whether it does so thanks to the neural
differences in affective processing that we measured. Second,
and relatedly, it is important also to know how individual
differences in the capacity to regulate emotion [26], and the
neural bases of that capacity, are related to political ideology.
A third set of questions concerns the bearing of the present
study on the development of biological measures of political
ideology. While it is of use in a variety of settings to measure
political ideology (political polls, for instance, typically include
some measurement of it), it remains an open question whether
biological measures could become more accurate, or more
useful, than the tools (such as self-report measures) currently
employed. Determining the answer to that question would
require answering a host of others: How would a machinelearning model based on data collected in one region (e.g.,
New York) support predictions of people’s political attitudes
in another region (e.g., Texas)? How fine-grained are the categories of affective response that are tied to political ideology?
Although our results show greater differentiation in political
ideology in cases of animal-reminder disgust than core/
contamination disgust, what are the links between political
ideology and other forms of disgust, such as moral disgust?
The more we learn about the sensitivity of political ideology
to subtle differences in affective response and their neural
bases, the more we will know about the feasibility of useful
and portable tools for ideology’s biological measurement.
This would then raise a further and difficult ethical question

Figure 4. Single Presentation of a Disgusting
Stimulus Is Sufficient to Make Accurate Predictions of Individual’s Political Orientation
(A) Hemodynamic response to the first disgusting
stimulus for the liberal and conservative groups,
extracted from the red-to-yellow voxels in Figure 3A. Shaded regions indicate 61 SE. Timeseries data were linearly interpolated every 1 s
for display purposes. ‘‘AUC’’ indicates the mean
AUC of ROC curves over 1,000 iterations.
(B) A representative ROC curve.
(C) Hemodynamic response to the first disgusting
stimulus, extracted from each predictive region,
as well as the mean AUCs of the corresponding
ROC curves. The x axis is time since stimulus presentation (s) and the y axis is the percent signal
change (percentage). Black inverse triangles indicate the stimulus onset, the bottom of which is at
0.05% signal change. DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; pre-SMA, presupplementary motor
area; BG, basal ganglia; AMYG/HIPP, amygdala/
hippocampus; MTG/STG, middle/superior temporal gyrus; FFG, fusiform gyrus; and PAG, periaqueductal gray.
See also Figure S4.

about the circumstances, if any, in
which it is appropriate to use such
tools. And, finally, the present study
raises important questions about the
possibility of, and obstacles to, understanding and cooperation across divides
in political ideology. Would the recognition that those with different political
beliefs from our own also exhibit
different disgust responses from our
own help us or hinder us in our ability
to embrace them as coequals in
democratic governance? Future work will be necessary to
answer these important questions.
Experimental Procedures
Participants
Eighty-three healthy individuals (males/females = 41/42; age = 18–62; mean
[SD] = 29.0 [11.3] years) in Roanoke and Blacksburg, VA, area were recruited
from a large database maintained by the Human Neuroimaging Laboratory
between September 2012 and September 2013. See the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures for inclusion/exclusion criteria for participants
and demographic data.
fMRI Task
Participants were informed that they would complete a simple visual
perception task. They were told to simply look at emotional pictures
when they were presented but to press a button when they saw a fixation
cross. Figure 1 depicts the time course of the fMRI experiment. It is a
passive picture-viewing task presenting a total of 20 disgusting, 20
threatening, 20 pleasant, and 20 neutral pictures, the order of which was
randomized for each participant. All the pictures were taken from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS) [14]. See Appendix S1 for
IAPS picture numbers, description, and valence/arousal ratings of all
pictures. Table S2 summarizes the mean IAPS valence and arousal
ratings in each emotion condition. Each picture was presented for 4 s.
Ten button-press (fixation-cross) trials were pseudorandomly mixed
with emotional pictures to help participants stay fully awake and
pay attention to visual stimuli. The fixation cross stayed on the screen
until a button was pressed. Each trial was separated by a Poissondistributed variable interval (mean = 10 s, SD = 10 s, minimum = 6 s,
maximum = 17 s). The experiment took approximately 20 min in total.
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NEMO (http://labs.vtc.vt.edu/hnl/nemo/index.html) was used for stimuli
presentation and behavioral response collection.
MRI Data Acquisition and Analysis
The anatomical and functional imaging sessions were conducted on a 3.0
tesla Siemens Magnetom Trio scanner at VTCRI. We used SPM8 (http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/) for preprocessing and standard GLM fMRI analyses. For the elastic net analysis, we used the glmnet
package for MATLAB (http://web.stanford.edu/whastie/glmnet_matlab/)
and R [47]. See the Supplemental Experimental Procedures for complete
details.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures, four figures, four tables, and two appendices and can be found
with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.09.050.
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(P.R.M.). The authors thank Sébastien Hétu, Jacob I. Lee, and Iris Vilares
for their helpful comments on a previous version of the manuscript.
Received: May 30, 2014
Revised: August 29, 2014
Accepted: September 19, 2014
Published: October 30, 2014
References
1. Jost, J.T., Federico, C.M., and Napier, J.L. (2009). Political ideology: its
structure, functions, and elective affinities. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 60,
307–337.
2. Haidt, J. (2012). The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by
Religion and Politics (New York: Pantheon).
3. Fowler, J.H., Baker, L.A., and Dawes, C.T. (2008). Genetic variation in
political participation. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 102, 233–248.
4. Alford, J.R., Funk, C.L., and Hibbing, J.R. (2005). Are political orientations genetically transmitted? Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 99, 153–167.
5. Hatemi, P.K., Gillespie, N.A., Eaves, L.J., Maher, B.S., Webb, B.T.,
Heath, A.C., Medland, S.E., Smyth, D.C., Beeby, H.N., Gordon, S.D.,
et al. (2011). A genome-wide analysis of liberal and conservative political attitudes. J. Polit. 73, 271–285.
6. Settle, J.E., Dawes, C.T., and Fowler, J.H. (2009). The heritability of
partisan attachment. Polit. Res. Q. 62, 601–613.
7. Kanai, R., Feilden, T., Firth, C., and Rees, G. (2011). Political orientations
are correlated with brain structure in young adults. Curr. Biol. 21,
677–680.
8. Amodio, D.M., Jost, J.T., Master, S.L., and Yee, C.M. (2007).
Neurocognitive correlates of liberalism and conservatism. Nat.
Neurosci. 10, 1246–1247.
9. Oxley, D.R., Smith, K.B., Alford, J.R., Hibbing, M.V., Miller, J.L., Scalora,
M., Hatemi, P.K., and Hibbing, J.R. (2008). Political attitudes vary with
physiological traits. Science 321, 1667–1670.
10. Dodd, M.D., Balzer, A., Jacobs, C.M., Gruszczynski, M.W., Smith, K.B.,
and Hibbing, J.R. (2012). The political left rolls with the good and the
political right confronts the bad: connecting physiology and cognition
to preferences. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 367, 640–649.
11. Smith, K.B., Oxley, D., Hibbing, M.V., Alford, J.R., and Hibbing, J.R.
(2011). Disgust sensitivity and the neurophysiology of left-right political
orientations. PLoS ONE 6, e25552.
12. Schaller, M., and Park, J.H. (2011). The behavioral immune system (and
why it matters). Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 20, 99–103.

13. Hibbing, J.R., Smith, K.B., and Alford, J.R. (2014). Differences in negativity bias underlie variations in political ideology. Behav. Brain Sci.
37, 297–307.
14. Lang, P.J., Bradley, M.M., and Cuthbert, B.N. (2008). International affective picture system (IAPS): affective ratings of pictures and instruction
manual. Technical Report A-8 (Gainesville: University of Florida).
15. Wilson, G.D., and Patterson, J.R. (1968). A new measure of conservatism. Br. J. Soc. Clin. Psychol. 7, 264–269.
16. Winkielman, P., and Berridge, K.C. (2004). Unconscious emotion. Curr.
Dir. Psychol. Sci. 13, 120–123.
17. Suzuki, A., Hoshino, T., Shigemasu, K., and Kawamura, M. (2006).
Disgust-specific impairment of facial expression recognition in
Parkinson’s disease. Brain 129, 707–717.
18. Zou, H., and Hastie, T. (2005). Regularization and variable selection via
the elastic net. J. R. Stat. Soc., B 67, 301–320.
19. Ryali, S., Supekar, K., Abrams, D.A., and Menon, V. (2010). Sparse logistic regression for whole-brain classification of fMRI data. Neuroimage
51, 752–764.
20. Whelan, R., Watts, R., Orr, C.A., Althoff, R.R., Artiges, E., Banaschewski,
T., Barker, G.J., Bokde, A.L.W., Büchel, C., Carvalho, F.M., et al.;
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